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RECENT DECISIONS
pensing with the exaction of special security from an appearing
defendant in a foreign attachment." Referring to the bank's posi-
tion, the Supreme Court said that although the bank may be called
upon to pay twice, it is no reason for declaring the statute unconsti-
tutional, as when it contracted with the depositor, it was cognizant of
the statute and its effect, and it voluntarily accepted the consequent
responsibility. The Court indicates that though the statute is con-
stitutional, it is, nevertheless, a harsh measure. We fail to appre-
ciate the alleged hardship. As pointed out by the Court of Appeals, T
the husband having chosen New York State as his domicile, he is
deemed to submit and acquiesce in any law of the state affecting his
property, which is or may be in force. If he subsequently abandons
his wife and child in this state and they are so destitute that they may
become public charges, the state, in furtherance of the welfare of the
community and under a proper exercise of its police power, may
sequester his property and use the same for the support and mainte-
nance of his wife and family. The basic facts upon which such
relief may be granted are: (a) The marital relationship and domicile
within the state; (b) the abandonment by husband or parent and his
absence from the state; (c) the necessary property or res within the
state. In this type of proceeding the absconder is represented by the
bank which may set up such defenses as would be available to him.
He is not divested of his right, upon his return, to nullify the entire
proceeding if he can prove the absence of the necessary jurisdictional
facts. What the legislature intended was to provide for the case
where a husband had property within the state and was concealing
himself or had disappeared, leaving a wife and family without means
and a possibility of becoming public charges, despite the fact that the
property may be sufficient to properly provide for them. Under
such circumstances, to render the property inaccessible to them, would
severely tax one's sense of fairness and justice. Lack of remedy in
such a case would mark the law as impotent.
E. H. L.
CORPORATIONS-RIGHT OF CORPORATION TO PURCHASE ITS OWN
STocK.-Upon the authority of a resolution of its board of directors,
a corporation contracted with one of its stockholders to purchase his
holdings at a specified sum. At the date of the execution of the con-
tract, the corporation's surplus was in excess of the price agreed upon.
Plaintiff delivered his stock to the corporation and received part of the
stipulated payments. The corporation thereafter became financially
embarrassed and its assets were turned over to a creditors' committee
which took over the management and control of the corporation and
sold its assets. Included in the assets sold were the shares formerly
owned by plaintiff. At the time of the assignment it was agreed
7250 N. Y. 136, 164 N. E. 882 (1929), opinion by Cardozo, Ch. J.
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that it should affect neither the merits of the plaintiff's claim for the
balance of the purchase price of his stock nor the right of the other
stockholders to dispute it. In conformity with this agreement, the
creditors disbursed the corporate assets, satisfying all the claims of
creditors except that of the plaintiff for unpaid instalments due on
the purchase of his stock and the claims of two officers for salaries
which had accrued subsequent to the date of the stock purchase con-
tract, these officers having participated in the vote approving the
purchase. The funds in possession of the creditors' committee are
insufficient to pay in full the three claims and the question at issue is
whether or not plaintiff's claim, which is prior to that of the officers
for salary, is valid and he should participate pro rata with them, or
whether plaintiff's claim should be declared invalid. Held, plaintiff's
right was superior to the claims of the corporation's officers for sal-
aries accruing subsequent to the purchase contract of which they had
notice; the agreement of the corporation to purchase its own stock,
though prohibited by law, was enforceable as against the assets in the
possession of the creditors' committee since neither the corporation
nor its stockholders objected. Cross v. Beguelin, 252 N. Y. 262,
169 N. E. 378 (1929).
In the absence of statutory or charter restriction, a corporation
has inherent power to purchase its own stock providing it is not to
the prejudice of creditors.' The assets are deemed to constitute a
trust fund for the benefit of creditors whose obligations must be dis-
charged in full before the right of any stockholder to any portion
thereof can be considered.2 By statute,3 a director who votes to
apply the funds of a corporation except surplus, directly or indirectly
to the purchase of its own stock, is guilty of a misdemeanor. While
the directors are not criminally liable if a surplus exists at the time
of their action, an agreement under which payment for the stock is
deferred is not valid as a binding contract unless there be a considera-
tion other than the mere promise of the corporation. The promise
of the corporation is but an illusory promise, for the enforceability
of the agreement depends upon the continued existence of a surplus,
a condition which as between the parties, is entirely within the control
of the corporation.4 "The rights of the creditors of the corporation
cannot be defeated by the fact that at the time the transaction was
entered into the seller of the stock and the officers of the company
'City Bank of Columbus v. Bruce, 17 N. Y. 507 (1858) ; Vail v. Hamilton,
85 N. Y. 453. 457 (1881) ; Joseph v. Raff, 82 App. Div. 47, 54, 81 N. Y. Supp.
546, aff'd 176 N. Y. 611, 68 N. E. 1118 (1903).
2Hollins v. Brierfield, etc. Co., 150 U. S. 371, 381, 383, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep.
127 (1893); McDonald v. Williams, 174 U. S. 397, 401, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 743
(1899); Trotter v. Lisman, 209 N. Y. 174, 102 N. E. 572 (1913) ; First Trust
Co. v. Illinois Cent. R. R. Co., 256 Fed. 830 (C. C. A., 8th, 1919).
'Penal Law, Sec. 664.
'Topken, Loring & Schwartz, Inc. v. Schwartz. 249 N. Y. 206, 163 N. E.
735 (1928); Richards v. Ernst Weiner Company, 207 N. Y. 509, 160 N. E. 592
(1912) ; Note (1929) 3 St. John's L. Rev., 276-280.
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who purchased it were acting in good faith and supposed that the
corporation was solvent." 5 In this case, however, all claims of prior
creditors had been satisfied and subsequent creditors (the officers)
had notice of the agreement to buy back the stock. Even though
there was no contract according to the tenets of former decisions of
the court,6 recovery was permitted. Hence the rule seems to be that
recovery may be had under an agreement to buy back stock as against
creditors who had notice of the agreement. This result departs from
mechanistic legal reasoning-for an agreement heretofore held to be
utterly void is in this instance, for sound reasons, enforced.
R.L.
HIGHWAY LAw-NEGLIGENCE OF OPERATOR OTHER THAN
OwNER ATTRIBUTABLE TO OwNER.-Plaintiff was struck and in-
jured in New York City by defendant's automobile which was being
operated by defendant's son at the time of the accident. The injuries
were the result solely of the negligence of the operator of the car.
Defendant disclaimed liability on the ground that at the time of the
accident his son was not operating the car in his business or with his
permission. He testified that he had given his permission for the
use of the car on Long Island but had expressly forbidden its being
taken into the city. The question with respect to the circumstances
under which the car was taken out on the particular occasion was not
tried before a jury, the parties having stipulated to waive a jury.
The trial Court directed a verdict for the plaintiff, holding that where
the owner intrusts his car to another to be used in the business or
pleasure of the driver, a violation of restrictions upon the route to be
taken should not relieve the owner from liability under the statute.
On appeal, held, error. The Highway Law ' imposes no liability on
the owner for the negligence of one who uses the automobile unlaw-
fully or without permission of the owner. Chaika v. Vandenberg,
252 N. Y. 101, 169 N. E. 103 (1929).
Evidence as to the owner's instructions to a person driving his
car is admissible to show the extent of his authority. The intent
of the legislature was not to make an arbitrary rule of liability on the
part of an owner for all accidents caused by the negligent operation
of his car but only in cases where an agency can be spelled out and
where the person is "legally using the same with permission of the
owner," which is interpreted by the instant case and a number of
Re Fechheimer Fishel Co., 212 Fed. 357, 363 (C. C. A., 2nd, 1914).
6 Supra Note 4.
' Sec. 282-e (Cons. L., Ch. 25), now Vehicle and Traffic Law. Sec. 59
(Cons. L., Ch. 71) : "Every owner of a motor vehicle * * * operated upon a
public highway shall be liable and responsible for death or injuries to person or
property resulting from negligence in the operation of such motor vehicle * * *
in the business of such owner or otherwise, by any person legally using or
operating the same with the permission, express or implied, of such owner."
